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THE ANALOGY BETWEEN NATURAL PERSONS
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONS IN THE
LAW OF NATIONS
I
INFLUENCE OF THE ANALOGY UPON THE CLASSICAL WRITERS
ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
The analogy between natural persons and international persons
was one of the main premises upon which the science of inter-
national law was founded in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. It was assumed that there existed a close resemblance,
for many purposes, between the legal rights and duties of natural
persons, subjects of municipal law, and the rights and duties
of those juristic persons which are the subjects of international
law. In one form or another the analogy was invoked con-
stantly from the time when the law of nations first became
a subject of juristic speculation and practical significance. The
early conceptions of the nature of international society were
based upon it. It furnished one of the essential premises in that
process of reasoning by which the law of nature was applied to
nations. It justified wholesale borrowing from the Roman jus
gentium. It has had an immeasurable influence upon the subse-
quent development of international law, having been appealed to
in later years as a reason for transplanting into the law of nations
many concepts, principles, and rules borrowed outright from
various systems of municipal law.
An examination of the writings of the great publicists, par-
ticularly those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, reveals
something of the extent to which we are indebted to this analogy
for almost everything that is regarded as fundamental in modern
international law. Such a study shows that the analogy has had
a significant influence in contributing to determine (I) our con-
ception of the nature of international society, (2) our conception
of the nature of the persons who compose that society, (3) our
conception of the nature of the law applicable to that society,
(4) the actual content of that law, and (5) the classification of
the content of that law.
It may be objected by members of a profession trained to look
for law primarily in sources other than text-books and treatises
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that conclusions based upon a study of the writers must have
a somewhat limited significance. We must remember, 
however,
that the sources of international law have never included much
that can be compared to statutes and judicial precedents 
in
municipal law; that international customs are hard to discover
and that there is almost no one to discover them but the writers;
and that in consequence the opinions of experts have been 
easily
the most authoritative source of international law. Statesmen
have always referred to the treatises of the great publicists 
as
authoritative sources of the highest value. The Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of The Paquete Habana 
and
The Lola, has said:
"where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commenta-
tors who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the sub-
jects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but f6r trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is."'
Kent says that
"in cases where the principal jurists agree, the presump-
tion will be very great in favor of the solidity of their
maxims; and no civilized nation, that does not arrogantly
set all ordinary law and justice at defiance, will venture




The opinions of writers have had a much greater 
influence
upon the development of the law of nations than 
upon the
development of any system of municipal law. In 
international
law, therefore, we shall-be obliged to attach an unwonted 
signifi-
cance to conclusions supported by the testimony of all 
the leading
publicists.
With these preliminary observations let us turn our 
attention
for a brief space to the influence of the analogy 
between natural
persons and international persons upon the system 
developed by
the great writers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, 
and eighteenth
S(19oo) 175 U. S. 677, 7oo. Cf. the language of 
Lord Coleridge in
The Queen v. Keyn (1876) 2 Ex. D. 63.
2Contntentaries, Vol. I, pp. i8-i9.
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centuries. It will not be possible to dwell at length upon theirindebtedness to the analogy for the content of their treatises and
for the principles of classification which they adopted. Someillustrations can be given, however, and something can be said
of the analogy's influence upon the fundamental conceptions of
the science.
After the Reformation the old theory of a common superior
decayed, due to the inability of either Emperor or Pope to com-mand universal obedience. The conception of a society of inde-
pendent states supplanted the idea of universal empire. It fell
to the lot of the early publicists to find an explanation for thissociety, its members, and its law. It was their task also to
discover the content of this new body of law and to classify
it. They derived the law applicable to the relations between inde-pendent states from two sources. In the first place, finding some
rules already in existence, especially in connection with diplomacy
and warfare, they referred to established customs, usages, andunderstandings. Finding that large parts of the field of inter-national relations were not covered by established custom, theysought a more general and permanent basis whereon to build
up a system of positive rules. They recurred, in the second place,
to the law of nature, a law grounded on reason and valid forall mankind, and applied it to the relations between independent
states.3  As Sir Henry Maine has said:
'On the use which the early writers made of the law of nature, seeBryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence (New York, igoi) Vol. II,pp. 602-604; Hicks, The Equality of States and The Hague Conferences(i9o8) 2 Am. Jou. INT. LAW, 530-561, 53I ff.; Lawrence, Essays onSome Disputed Questions (London, 1884) p. 185; Maine, Ancient Law(4th Am. from ioth London ed., New York, 19o6) pp. 92 ff.; Nys, Lesorigines du droit international (Paris, 1894) p. 8.
On the law of nature generally, see also Brini, Jus Naturale (Bologna,1889) ; Carlyle, History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West(London, 19o3-1915); Dunning, History of Political Theories (New York,
1902-1905) ; H~ly, Etude sur le droit de la guerre de Grotius (Paris, 1875)pp. 2o7 ff.; Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence (ioth ed., New York,i9o6) pp. 3o-38; Hunter, Roman Law (3d ed., London, 1897) ; Muirhead,Law of Rome (2d ed., London, 1899) ; Phillipson, International Law andCustom of Ancient Greece and Rome (London, 1911) ; Pollock, Historyof the Law of Nature (1900) 2 JoUR. Soc. Comp. LEG. (N. s.) 418-433;Ritchie, Natural Rights (London, 1903); Vaunois, De la notion du droitnaturel cher les Romains (Paris, 1884); Voigt, Das jus naturale aequumet bonum und jus gentium der Rdiner (Leipzig, 1856-1876); Walker,History of the Law of Nations (Cambridge, 1899); Haines, The Lawof Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions (1916) 25 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 617.
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"they laid down unreservedly that Natural Law is the
code of states, and thus put in operation a process which
has continued almost down to our own day, the process of
engrafting on the international system rules which are
supposed to have been evolved from the unassisted con-
templation of the. conception of Nature."
4
They reasoned that men in a state of nature were controlled by
natural law; that since there was no common superior to control
the relation of international persons they must be in a state of
nature with respect to each other; and that by analogy with
men in a state of nature international persons must be controlled
by natural law. The writers made a twofold use of this law
of nature. From the theoretical natural law expounded by the
philosophers they borrowed conceptions, by means of the analogy,
which helped them to explain international society and the law
applicable thereto. But there was another and a more substantial
kind of natural law. At Rome the notion of nature as a source
of law had passed from philosophy into legal thought. The
jus naturale had become closely identified with the jus gentium,
a system of private law which was supposed to be founded on
natural reason and to exist among many peoples.
5 From the
jus gentium, regarded as a natural code, the writers derived a
large body of practical rules, as well as principles of classification,
which they incorporated into the international system.
This tendency to draw upon the theory and content of munic-
ipal law, upon the assumption that an analogy exists between
natural persons and international persons, appears in the treatises
of the forerunners of Grotius, including Victoria (1480-1546),
Vasquez (1509-1566), Ayala (1548-1584), Suarez (548-I617),
and Gentilis (I552-I6o8).6
"Op. cit., p. 96.
'Dig., i, i, i, 4; Gaius, Inst, i, I.
'Victoria, Relectiones undecim (Salamanca, 1565). First published at
Lyons in 1557. See Barth~lemy in Les fondateurs du droit international
(Paris, 1904) pp. 1-36; and Walker, op. cit., pp. 214-230.
Vasquez, Controversiarum illustrium (Venice, 1564). See Walker, op.
cit., pp. 245-246 and passim.
Ayala, De lure et Oficiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari, in The Classics
of International Law, published by the Carnegie Institution of Washing-
ton (Washington, 1912). First published at Douay in 1582. See Walker,
op. cit., pp. 247-249.
Suarez, Tractatus de legibus (Mayence, 16ig). First published at Coim-
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It is more conspicuous in the De Jure Beli ac Pacis7 of Grotius
(1583-1645). While Grotius does not elaborate in a systematic
way upon those subtle comparisons by which later writers explain
the nature of international society and international law, he does
dwell occasionally upon the natural condition of mankind8 and
make occasional use of an analogy between men in a state of
nature and international persons uncontrolled by superior author-
ity." He relies frequently upon the analogy between natural and
international persons to support the rules laid down. "And these
artificial bodies have plainly an analogy with natural bodies," he
says.10 His reliance is explicit where he compares the ruler
of a state to the master of a family,11 clients under the protection
of patrons to international persons protected by an unequal
alliance,12 and natural persons reduced to slavery to international
persons reduced by conquest.1 It appears also in what he says
of diseased states,'4 and in what he says of the right of states,
analogous to the right of individuals out of society, to punish
grievous violations of the law of nature or of nations, although
bra in 1612. See Dunning, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 135-149; Rolland in Les
fondateurs, pp. 95-124; and Walker, op. cit., pp. 155-156.
Gentilis, De legationibus (Hanover, 1594); De jure belli (Holland's
ed., Oxford, 1877); and Hispanicae advocationis (Amsterdam, 1761).
First published at London in 1585, 588-89, and 1613 respectively. See
Holland, Studies in International Law (Oxford, i898) pp. 1-39; Nizard
in Les fondateurs, pp. 37-93; Phillipson in Great Jurists of the World
(Boston, 1914) pp. 1O9-143; and Walker, op. cit., pp. 249-276.
"I have consulted the reproduction of the edition of 1646 in The
Classics of International Law (Washington, 1913), the French translation
of Pradier-Fodiri (Paris, 1867), and Whewell's edition (Cambridge,
1853).
Among secondary works, see Basdevant in Les fondateurs, pp. 125-267;
Dunning, op. cit., VoL II, chap. 5; Hallam, Introduction to the Litera-
ture of Europe (New York, 1859) Vol. II, pp. 141-162; Hdly, op. cit.;
Lawrence, op. cit., Essay IV; Rattigan in Great Jurists of the World,
pp. 169-184; Walker, op. cit., pp. 278-337; White, Seven Great Statesmen
(New York, 1910) pp. 55-IIO.
'I, iv, 7, 3; I, v, I; II, ii, 2; II, x, 1, 2; II, xx, 8-9; II, xx, 4o, 1-4;
and III, vii, i, i.
' II, xi, 5, 3; II, xx, 40.
'Plane autem corpora haec artificialia instar habent corporis naturalis.
II, ix, 3, I.
"I, iii, 16, I.
'I, iii, 21.
"II, xxi, 7,:2; ni, viii, -4."III, iii, 2, 2.
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they themselves may not have suffered immediate injury. 5 He
carries the analogy to an absurd extreme when he tells us that
there are evidently as many sources of war as there are of actions
at law. 16 Passages like the above illustrate the use which Grotius
makes of the analogy, but they hardly suggest the importance of
his indebtedness to municipal law. His work bristles with bor-
rowings. The atmosphere of legal science in his day was an
atmosphere of Roman law. In the jus gentium he had an unfail-
ing supply of principles, and he used it unsparingly. He bor-
rows from it whole categories of rules relating to property,
contracts, and other topics. His classification is based upon the
divisions of municipal law, as a mere reading of his table of
contents will reveal. It was this borrowed element that assured
the permanence of his system. "The system of Grotius lived
because it was grafted on a living tree."
1 7
Among the successors of Grotius three tendencies appeared,
represented by the naturalists, the positivists, and the Grotians
respectively. The naturalists held that the so-called law of
nations was nothing more than the law of nature applied to the
society of international persons; and they accordingly denied to
the positive, customary, or conventional element the character of
real law apart from the natural law. The positivists contended
that the principles underlying customs and treaties constituted
a positive international law distinct from the natural law and of
superior practical importance. The Grotians took an inter-
mediate position, retaining Grotius' distinction between the
natural law and the positive or voluntary law of nations, but
unlike Grotius treating the two as of equal importance."'
The naturalists made an unsparing use of the analogy between
natural and international persons, both to explain international
II, xx, 40.
lII, i, 2, i.
.. . . . . made known by generations of mediaeval legal thinkers,
the principles of pure Roman Civil Law yet spoke in the day of Grotius
with the authority of lex scripta. The obligatory force which men
acknowledged in these principles as rules of a municipal legal system was
accorded them when they were enunciated as laws of international con-
duct. The system of Grotius lived because it was grafted on a living
tree." Walker, op. cit., pp. 334-335.
"S H6ly, op. cit., pp. 221-222; Hershey, Essentials of International Public
Law (New York, 1914) PP. 59-63; Phillipson in Great Jurists of the
World, p. 394.
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society, the persons included therein, and the law applicable
thereto, and also to justify copious borrowings from municipal
law, principally of course from the Roman jus gentium. The
use made of the analogy by the positivists was only a little less
obvious. They placed less emphasis upon an analogy between
states and men in a state of nature, and upon natural rights, and
more emphasis upon the development of international law through
custom founded on consent. Their understanding of consent,
its nature and effect, was determined by recourse to principles of
municipal law. They drew freely from municipal law wherever
there was insufficient evidence of established international prac-
tice or agreement. It remained for the Grotians to discover
that the analogy between natural and international persons had
been abused, and that natural law ought to be adapted, when
applied to international persons, to the nature of its new sub-
jects. Their discovery was a significant one, but unfortunately
it seems to have influenced the theory of international law more
than the substance. We can refer briefly to only a few of the
leading representatives of each of these three tendencies.
The bias of the naturalists was largely determined by a writer
who touched upon the law of nations only incidentally, and whose
influence upon the subsequent development of the science is all
too little appreciated. In his De Cive and Leviathan,0 Hobbes
(1588-1679) revived for the purposes of juridical philosophy the
whole mediaeval theory of natural law and the state of nature.
Hobbes draws a close analogy between man and the state,20 and
"Elementa Philosophica de Cive (Amsterdam, 1657); and Leviathan,
Waller's ed. in Cambridge English Classics (Cambridge, 19o4). The
former was first published in 1642, and the latter in 1651. See de Mont-
morency in Great Jurists of the World, pp. 195-219.
' Hobbes introduced his Leviathan with the following passage: "For
by ART is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-
WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall
Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose
protection and defense it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty
is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The
Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall
Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of the
Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty)
are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The Wealth
and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength; Salus Populi
(the people's safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom all things need-
full for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and
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contends that states stand to one another in the same relation that
existed between men in the state of nature.2 1 He concludes that
the law of nature and the law of nations are the same thing, the
latter consisting simply in the application of the former to the
society of independent states.2 2 In 1658 Pufendorf (1632-1694)
spent eight months in a Danish prison, meditating on what he
had read in Hobbes and Grotius. Several years afterward he
published his ponderous magnum opus, entitled De Jure Naturae
et Gentium,23 in which he combined, many of the theories of
Hobbes with a large part of the practical code elaborated by
Grotius. Where Pufendorf differs from Grotius his opinion is
usually traceable to the influence of Hobbes. He borrows from
Hobbes his conception of the law of nature, his identification of
the law of nature and of nations, and his theory of international
society. He refutes the Grotian conception of a voluntary or
positive law of nations, and subscribes implicitly to the opinion
of Hobbes that the law of nations is nothing but the law of nature
applied to independent states.24  Both are made up of the same
precepts, for as soon as they are formed states assume the per-
sonal properties of men, and stand in the same relation to each
other that prevailed between men in the state of nature.25 Pufen-
dorf's work enjoyed an immense success; and for nearly a
century a majority of the continental writers on natural law
and the law of nations, especially in Germany, acknowledged
his leadership. The naturalists, for whom Hobbes was the
animating spirit and Pufendorf the leader, drew the con-
tent of their system and its principles of classification from
municipal law. They derived their fundamental ideas of inter-
national persons, international society, and the law of nations
Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord, Health; Sedition, Sick-
nesse; and Civill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts and Covenants, by which
the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and
united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God
in the Creation." Introd. See also Pt. II, chap. xvii.
'De Cive, chap. xiii, sec. 7; Leviathan, Pt II, chap. xxx.
'De Cive, chap. xiv, sec. 4; Leviathan, Pt II, chaps. xxix and xxx.
'First published in 1672. I have consulted Kennett's English transla-
tion (5th ed., London, 1749), and Barbeyrac's French translation (Leyden,
1759). See Avril in Les fondateurs, pp. 331-383; and Phillipson in Great
Jurists of the World, pp. 305-344.
II, iii, 23.
'II, ii, I; II, ii, 4; VII, i, 8; VIII, iv, 18; VIII, vi, i; VIII, vi, 12;
and passim.
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from their implicit belief in the natural law of mankind and in
its application by analogy to international persons. Rutherforth
(1712-1771), writing in the next century, illustrates their basic
idea. He finds an element of consent, giving international law
a positive character in its application, in the universal agreement
of all nations to recognize the state-personality of each; but he
contends that international law is entirely natural in its subject-
matter. If one understands, he says,
"what the law of nature is, when it is applied to indi-
vidual persons in a state of equality, he will seldom be at
a loss to judge what it is, when he is to apply it to nations





The positive character of international law was emphasized by
Rachel27 (1628-1691) and Textor 28 (1637-1701). Their treatises
were a protest against the naturalist school; and yet, while basing
international law primarily upon positive agreement, they stressed
the analogy between natural and international persons almost
as much as the school of Pufendorf. Rachel says that
"it is by agreement after the manner of private indivi-
duals that the Law of Nations is set up by free peoples"
and that "by means of that Law they are formed into a
Society and are bound to one another."
29
The law of nations cannot be wantonly abrogated, Rachel tells
us, because
"it is a rule of Civil Law that a society or partnership
can not be quitted in any way that savors of fraud (Dig.
17, 2,-14); and the same rule holds even more in the
society of Nations." 30
Furthermore,
"if two subjects of the same State have bound themselves
by an agreement and one commits a fraud on the agree-
"Institutes of the Natural Law (2d Am. ed., Baltimore, 1832) II, ix,
5 and 7. Rutherforth's work was first published in 1754-56.
'De Jure Naturae et Gentium Dissertationes, in The Classics of Inter-
national Law (Washington, I916). First published in 1676.
'Synopsis Juris Gentium, in The Classics of International Law (Wash-
ington, 1916). First published in i68o.
De lure Gentium, secs. 2 and 3.
"Ibid., sec. 88.
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ment, the other can restrain him -by judicial authority and
obtain redress by action at Law; in just the same way,
as there is no common tribunal for free Nations, one of
them may, other things being equal, resort to war as a
means of compelling another, who has proved perfidious,
to carry out what has been agreed on." 3'
These are examples of the more obvious influence of the analogy
in Rachel's treatise. Both Rachel and Textor drew heavily from
the Roman law. Of a considerable part of Textor's Synopsis
Juris Gentium, Professor Ludvig von Bar remarks that it is
"more frequently based on the principles of private law,
and therefore does not do justice to the real needs and
relations of the Law of Nations. 32
Textor's tendency is well illustrated in what he says about the
interpretation of treaties:
"What of the Roman Law? Do its canons of interpre-
tation apply to the public agreements of kings and peoples?
If we are speaking of those canons which have the force
of Law and bind contracting parties, Grotius is probably
right (ch. 16, sec. 31.) that Roman Law is not to be
adopted as a standard any further than the conduct of the
peoples of the world show that it is received by them as
the Law of Nations. If, however, we understand the
question to refer simply to the persuasive and probable
aspects of the interpretation of treaties, an affirmative
answer is correct although Roman Law is not received as
Law, because there is a balance of probability on the side
of that king or people who can claim the support of the
Roman Law, a system which, by the consent of nearly
all mankind, is uniquely just. In this connection we have
the remarks of de Thou (preface to his History), that the
whole (cultured) world was Roman, so that the legal
pronouncements on a case can easily be ascertained by
the use of the Roman Law as a Law of Nations."' 33
Both naturalists and positivists depended extensively upon
municipal law for their conceptions, classifications, and rules.
This is not surprising, but it is surprising that they defended
their dependence as practically and theoretically sound. In
theory at least, the Grotians saw the danger in this dogmatic and
undiscriminating use of the analogy, and made an effort to cor-
'Ibid., sec. 91.
Textor, op. cit., Vol. II, Introd., p. ioa.
Chap. xxiv, secs. 29-30.
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rect it. Wolff (1679-1754) is the most illustrious advocate of
their point of view. His position is well stated in the preface
to his ."us Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum,3' where
he says:
"It is true that Nations can only be considered as so
many individual persons living together in a state of
nature, and therefore all the duties and the rights which
nature prescribes and imposes upon all men, in so far as
they are by nature born free and are held together only
by the ties of nature, should be applied to states as well."
He calls this the natural or necessary law of nations. So far
his position is the same as that of the naturalists, but he con-
tinues:
"But as Nations or sovereign States are corporate per-
sons and the subjects of obligations and rights which in
virtue of the natural law result from the act of associa-
tion by which political bodies are formed, the nature and
essence of these moral persons will necessarily differ in
many respects from the nature and essence of the physical
units, or men, who compose them. Hence, since rights
and duties must be consistent with the nature of their
subjects, in applying to Nations the duties which the
natural law imposes upon each individual and the rights
it confers in order that he may fulfil those duties, they
must necessarily be changed so as to suit the nature of the
new subjects. Thus it is seen that the Law of Nations is
not the same at all points as the natural Law, since the
latter controls the actions of individuals."
This was the first explicit recognition by a great publicist of
the fundamental defect in the process of building international
law upon an analogy between natural and international persons.
Wolff's theories were given a wider currency through the work
of his brilliant admirer Vatte 5 (1714-1767). Like his great
master, Vattel treats the natural or necessary law of nations as a
separate science consisting of a just and rational application
"Published at Frankfort and Leipzig in 1764. See Olive in Les
fondateurs, pp. 447-479.
Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliquis a la
Conduite aux Affaires des Nations et des Souverains, in The Classics of
International Law (Washington, 1916). First published in 1758. See
Mallarm6 in Les fondateurs, pp. 48i-6oi; and Phillipson in Great Jurists
of the World, pp. 477-504.
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analogy already well entrenched in the literature of the science.
The analogy between natural and international persons has con-
tinued to be a factor of great significance in the evolution of the
law of nations.
It has been invoked repeatedly to explain international society.
The more modern view is exemplified in Hall, who says:
"It is postulated by those independent states which are
dealt with by international law that they have a moral
nature identical with that of individuals, and that with
respect to one another they are in the same relation as
that in which individuals stand to each other who are
subject to law.""8
It accounts for the emphasis placed by a majority of
the writers upon the so-called primary, inherent, absolute,
inalienable, or fundamental rights of states, rights derived
originally from no other source than the fictitious analogy with
men controlled by natural law. Take Kliiber,39 for example,
at the beginning of the modern period. His position is similar
to that taken by a great many others.4 Klilber regards nations
as so many persons living in a state of natural liberty. He con-
siders the law of nations as natural so far as it results from the
nature of international society, and positive so far as it results
from tacit or express convention.4 1 From the nature of inter-
'International Law (6th ed. by Atlay, Oxford, i9og) p. 17.
'Droit des gens moderne de l'Europe (2d French ed. by Ott, Paris,
1874). First published in French in 18ig and in Germn in 1821.
, "Until the last two decades of the nineteenth century all jurists agreed
that the membership of the Family of Nations includes so-called funda-
mental rights for States. Such rights are chiefly enumerated as the right
of existence, of self-preservation, of equality, of independence, of terri-
torial supremacy, of holding and acquiring territory, of intercourse, and of
good name and reputation. It was and is maintained that these funda-
mental rights are a matter of course and self-evident, since the Family
of Nations consists of Sovereign States. But no unanimity exists with
regard to the number, the names, and the contents of these alleged funda-
mental rights. A great confusion exists in this matter, and hardly two
text-book writers agree in details with regard to. it. This condition of
things has led to a searching criticism of the whole matter, and several
writers have in consequence thereof asked that the fundamental rights
of States should totally disappear from the treatises on the Law of
Nations." Oppenheim, International Law (2d ed., London, 1912) Vol. I,
pp. i65-166.
'Op. cit., sec. i.
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analogy already well entrenched in the literature of the science.
The analogy between natural and international persons has con-
tinued to be a factor of great significance in the evolution of the
law of nations.
It has been invoked repeatedly to explain international society.
The more modern view is exemplified in Hall, who says:
"It is postulated by those independent states which are
dealt with by international law that they have a moral
nature identical with that of individuals, and that with
respect to one another they are in the same relation as
that in which individuals stand to each other who are
subject to law." 8
It accounts for the emphasis placed by a majority of
the writers upon the so-called primary, inherent, absolute,
inalienable, or fundamental rights of states, rights derived
originally from no other source than the fictitious analogy with
men controlled by natural law. Take Kliiber,39 for example,
at the beginning of the modern period. His position is similar
to that taken by a great many others.40 KlIiber regards nations
as so many persons living in a state of natural liberty. He con-
siders the law of nations as natural so far as it results from the
nature of international society, and positive so far as it results
from tacit or express convention.41 From the nature of inter-
'International Law (6th ed. by Atlay, Oxford, 19o9) p. 17.
'Droit des gens moderne de l'Europe (2d French ed. by Ott, Paris,
1874). First published in French in i8ig and in German in I821.
'"Until the last two decades of the nineteenth century all jurists agreed
that the membership of the Family of Nations includes so-called funda-
mental rights for States. Such rights are chiefly enumerated as the right
of existence, of self-preservation, of equality, of independence, of terri-
torial supremacy, of holding and acquiring territory, of intercourse, and of
good name and reputation. It was and is maintained that these funda-
mental rights are a matter of course and self-evident, since the Family
of Nations consists of Sovereign States. But no unanimity exists with
regard to the number, the names, and the contents of these alleged funda-
mental rights. A great confusion exists in this matter, and hardly two
text-book writers agree in details with regard to. it. This condition of
things has led to a searching criticism of the whole matter, and several
writers have in consequence thereof asked that the fundamental rights
of States should totally disappear from the treatises on the Law of
Nations." Oppenheim, International Law (2d ed., London, 1912) Vol. I,
pp. 165-I66.
'Op. cit., sec. i.
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national society he concludes that the rights of nations are similar
to the rights of men living in a state of natural liberty, and;
therefore, that the rights attributed by nature or reason to indi-
viduals should in like manner be attributed to independent states.
He finds accordingly that independent states have certain original
or natural rights, namely, the rights of self-preservation, of
independence, and of equality.42 A conclusion, similar in several
respects to Kliber's, was defended not long ago by Mr. Robert
Lansing in a paper entitled "The Relation of International Law
to Fundamental Rights."
"If the analogy between a community of persons and
the community of nations is even in a measure complete,"
remarks Mr. Lansing, "then a state must possess funda-
mental rights analogous to the personal rights of life,
liberty and property. That it does, I think, may be
asserted without hesitation, the analogous fundamental
rights being those of existence, independence, and the
acquisition and control of possessions."43
There is a most amazing use of the analogy to bolster up the
doctrine of fundamental rights in the recent Declaration of the
Rights of Nations formulated and adopted by the American
Institute of International Law.44 According to this Declaration,
"the municipal law of civilized nations recognizes and
protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right
to the pursuit of happiness, as added by the Declaration
of Independence of the United States of America, the
right to legal equality, the right to property, and the right
to the enjoyment of the aforesaid rights"; "these funda-
mental rights can be stated in terms of international law
and applied to the relations of the members of the society
of nations, one with another, just as they have been
applied in the relations of the citizens or subjects of the
states forming the Society of Nations"; and stated in
terms of international law they are "the right of the nation
to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence; the
right of independence and the freedom to develop itself
Op. cit., secs. 37, 38, 45, and 89.
"American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Dis-
putes, Proceedings (1912) pp. 228-243, 232.
"For the text of the Declaration see (I916) xo Am. Joun. INT. LAW,
124; and (Jan. 24, 1916) TuE NEW Yomx TiMEs. See also Root (1916)
io AM. JouR. INT. LAW, 211-221; and my criticism of the Declaration in
(1916) 6 THE NEW REPUBLIC, 9r.
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without interference or control from other nations; the
right of equality in law and before law; the right to
territory within defined boundaries and to exclusive juris-
diction therein; and the right to the observance of these
fundamental rights."45
It is expressly stated that the right to exist
"is to be understood in the sense in which the right to
life is understood in national law, according to which
it is unlawful for a human being to take human life unless
it be necessary so to do in self-defense against an unlaw-
ful attack threatening the life of the party unlawfully
attacked."
The analogy between natural and international persons explains
a large part of the content of the law of nations. Those prin-
ciples which refer to dominion, its nature, limitations, and the
modes of acquiring and securing it, are pure Roman property
law transcribed from the jus gentium.46 Rules relating to the
obligations arising from treaties and to treaty interpretation are
derived largely from a similar source.4 7  Rights incidental to
the navigation of international rivers are based upon Roman law
principles by the same reasoning.48 The rule of the jus gentium
forbidding private property in the sea4 9 has been invoked in
support of the freedom of the seas. Happily the analogy was
not pressed too far in this instance; the Roman rule, if applied
without qualification, would have denied jurisdiction over terri-
torial seas no less than over the open sea.50
Undiscriminating reliance upon the analogy has engrafted a
great many unsound principles and impractical rules into the
international system. The process of borrowing from Roman
property law has obscured the distinction between jurisdiction
and property, the former having been described by many writers
as a right to property. Attention has been fixed on the points
'A distinguished authority on international relations is said to have
remarked that the Declaration of the Rights of Nations reminded him
of the fakir who sold pills which he claimed were "good for earthquakes."
Grotius, op. cit., II, i-x; Maine, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
Grotius, op. cit., II, xi-xvi.
'Wheaton, Elements of International Law (8th ed. by Dana, Boston,
1866) sec. 194.
"Institutes of Justinian (trans. Moyle, Oxford, 1913) II, i, 1-5.
'Westlake, International Law (2d ed., Cambridge, 1910-13), Vol. I,
p. 164.
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of resemblance rather than upon the essential differences, and
it is only among modem writers that the importance of bring-
ing the differences into full relief has been appreciated. 51 There
has been a similar confusion of ideas with reference to interna-
tional leases, usually alienations disguised in order to spare the
susceptibility of the state at whose cost they are made.52  Gro-
tius borrowed the Roman idea of succession on death and adopted
it without modification as the principle of state succession.53
His error has been corrected, but the heritage of confusion has
not been easily cleared away.54 Attempts to borrow from the
Roman law of contracts, persons, private wrongs, and public
wrongs have been equally confusing in many instances. It is
unnecessary to multiply illustrations.5
Historically speaking the Roman law is the actual basis for
the law of nations. From its rich treasury the deficiencies of
international precedent, usage, and express authority have been
supplied.56
Westlake, op. cit., VoL I, pp. 88-9o.
'Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 135-136.
,III, ix, 12.
Huber, Die Staaten-Succession (Leipzig, 1898).
' There is an interesting illustration of the influence of municipal law
upon the growth of international law in the Anglo-American doctrine of
domicile as a test of hostile character. Westlake remarks that "it can
scarcely be d6ubted that it is in some degree referable to the fact that
in England the admiralty judges have usually been also the judges in
probate and matrimonial matters, accustomed in the latter capacity to
apply domicile as a criterion, and to rely on old jurists in whose language
domicile and nationality were confounded." Op. cit., VoL I, p. 213.
Confusion wrought by the careless use of doubtful analogies has not
been confined to international law. It is an all too familiar experience in
municipal law. Constitutional law in the United States affords some
examples, notably in such matters as the right of corporations to sue in
the federal courts [Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (New York,
i9og) secs. 386-39o] ; and the constructions placed upon the clause
forbidding impairment of the obligation of contracts.
"Nys, Le droit international (Paris, 1912), Vol. I, pp. 2o6-212; Philli-
more, Commentaries Upon International Law (3d ed., London, 1879-1889)
Vol. I, pp. 30-37.
Phillimore says: "Independently of the historical value of the Roman
Law as explanatory of the terms and sense of treaties, and of the language
of jurists, its importance as a repository of decisions, the spirit of which
almost always, and the letter of which very frequently, is applicable to
the controversies of independent States, can scarcely be overstated."
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"Indeed," says Halleck, "the greater number of con-
troversies between states would find a just solution in this
comprehensive system of practical equity, which furnishes
principles of universal jurisprudence :.pplicable alike to
individuals and to states.
57
Maine declares that, aside from the positive or conventional
law of nations, it is surprising how large a part of the system
is made up of pure Roman law, and astonishing how small a
proportion the additions made to international law since Grotius'
day bear to the ingredients which have been simply taken from
the most ancient stratum of the Roman jus gentium.58 And
Pollock asserts that the distinctly legal conceptions of the modern
law of nations are Roman and purely Roman.59
The generous principles of the jus gentium commended it to
many peoples, but it is of course a mere truism to say that its
principles were never designed for international persons. It
was always a system of municipal law. Its extraordinary use-
fulness should not blind us to the deficiencies in the international
system which resulted from utilizing its content without ade-
quate discrimination. These deficiencies should not only be
corrected, they should serve as a warning against permitting the
analogy between natural and international persons to introduce
further confusion into the law of nations. It is difficult to see
much advantage in such analogies as those suggested by
Holland, for example, between partially dependent states and
infancy, coverture, or tutelage, and between the obligations of
neutrality and prohibitions of champerty, maintenance, or inter-
ference with the course of criminal justice.6 0 It is certainly
folly to repeat Zouch's description of warfare as "the litigation
of nations."
The analogy is at the foundation of most of our accepted
classifications in international law. According to Holland,
"the Law of Nations is but private law 'writ large.' It
is an application to political communities of those legal
ideas which were originally applied to the relations of
individuals. Its leading distinctions are therefore naturally
those with which Private Law has long ago rendered us
familiar."
' 1
'International Law (New York, 1861) p. 55.
" Op. cit., pp. 93, 97.
"Maine, op. cit., p. 410, note on The Origins of the Modern Law of
Nations.
® Op. cit., pp. 385, 393.
Studies in International Law (Oxford, x898) pp. 152-153.
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The analogy's abuse is responsible for a good deal of unsound
classification in international law. Systematic divisions borrowed
from municipal law have usually proved to be ill-suited to the
international system. Where the writers have departed from
familiar principles of municipal classification it has too often
been to arrange the content of their treatises with reference to
the so-called fundamental rights of nations, rights which are
mere corollaries resulting from the conception of the independent
state as an artificial person, and which ought to be discussed, if
at all, under the law of status.
III
CRITICISM OF THE ANALOGY
The analogy has not escaped criticism among modem writers.
Westlake says of the alleged inherent rights of states that
"it is a logical error to assume, because states are moral
persons and therefore capable of rights equally with
natural individuals, that they must have the same rights
as natural individuals."
8 2
It is surprising, however, that the analogy has not been challenged
more frequently and with greater effect. So far as the present
writer is aware it has never been subjected to a thoroughly criti-
cal analysis upon its merits. The question of its intrinsic right-
ness has usually been evaded by resort to qualifications and other
refinements of reasoning.
There are some reasons for this evasiveness which must appeal
to us as grounded in common sense. It is undoubtedly true, for
example, that the jurists have been able, by borrowing from
familiar systems of municipal law, to keep the law of nations
abreast with the advancing needs of humanity without the appear-
ance of radical change that arouses conservative opposition. It
is also true that the analogy has made it easier to give precision
and content to a subject that has been in constant danger of being
lost iri nebulous speculation. There are other reasons for the
analogy's persistence which are harder to justify. The analogy
has been regarded as axiomatic. Early writers were accustomed
to speak with an air of dogmatic finality, the spell of which, in
some instances, has never been broken. The premise under dis-
' Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 307.
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cussion is an illustration. The analogy is the very foundation
for several important principles of international law. If profane
hands should be laid upon it some sacred pillars of the interna-
tional edifice might come toppling down. This circumstance
encourages a leniently uncritical attitude. Finally, the analogy
has provided jurists trained in the various systems of municipal
law with a convenient substitute for originality. Want of origin-
ality may be pardoned in Grotius and the early publicists who
lived in a world almost devoid of international system. They
met humanity's need by drawing from the law of nature and
from the systems of national law with which they were familiar.
But surely it cannot be said that writers of the present day are
similarly excusable, with the record of almost three centuries of
the Grotian system open for their enlightenment.. It would
seem, as I have remarked elsewhere, that those who persist in the
twentieth century in reciting the ancient dogmatic analogies
between the rights of human beings and the rights of nations are
suffering from a dearth of ideas.
There may be comfortable reasons in normal times for not
tampering with the premises of international law. These are
not normal times. The international system is in the crucible of
barbaric strife. Its reconstruction will call for vastly more than
the mere restoration of what has been destroyed. There will
be need for new concepts and the elaboration of new principles.
Constructive criticism should not be restricted to the content of
international law. There should be a revaluation of premises,
and among them of the analogy between natural and international
persons. If we remain indifferent to this necessity we shall be
placed inevitably in a false position. We shall be called to the
defense of principles founded upon false postulates. We may
find ourselves asserting the soundness of conclusions while
refusing to argue the validity of premises. Our position is cer-
tain to prove untenable; and international law will be in danger
of becoming divorced more than ever from international realities.
A revaluation of the analogy would be a distinct contribution
to the much needed adjustment between international law and
the world in which we live. It would place less emphasis
upon fictitious resemblances and more upon inherent differences.
The analogy's defects are obvious if we consider the precise com-
parison which it involves. By natural persons we mean living
human beings, the subjects of municipal law. By international
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persons we mean those independent, organized entities whose
rights and duties form the subject-matter of international law.
They are sometimes described as artificial entities.
63 It is con-
venient for many purposes to think of the international person
as an artificial person, but we must not make the mistake of
thinking that it can have rights and duties wholly unaffected by
the nature of its essential elements. A comparison of the ele-
ments essential to the existence of a natural person with the
elements generally considered essential to the existence of an
international person brings into striking relief some of the
fundamental difficulties involved in an analogy between the two.
The first element essential to the existence of an international
person is its population."4 This element admits of a variety of
differences for which there are no satisfactory parallels in a society
of natural persons. Among human beings there is an approxima-
tion to uniformity in the physical constituents of life, while
among states there is the greatest diversity. There is diversity
in respect to numbers, ranging all the way from Andorra's 6,ooo,
Panama's 427,ooo, or Montenegro's 520,000, to 175,000,000 in
Russia, and more than 437,000,000 in the British Empire. There
is diversity in respect to quality. Before the outbreak of the
present war Belgium had a population about the same as that
of Abyssinia, and Sweden a population approximately equal to
that of Siam, but the differences between these countries result-
ing from differences in the quality of their populations were too
evident to require emphasis. From the population arise the
peculiar problems of nationality and alienage, including control
over nationals abroad, admission of aliens to the territory, treat-
ment of aliens in the territory, determination of nationality,
naturalization and expatriation, and the status of subject races.
The distribution of the population within a country, its unity
or diversity in respect to race and nationality, its separation into
classes based on birth, wealth, or occupation, and its capacity
Gray defines the state as "an artificial person created in order that,
by assuming it as the entity whose organs are the men engaged in pro-
tecting a mass of human beings from external and internal fraud and
violence, a unity of operation may be given to those organs." Op. cit.,
sec. i49.
"There is a brief discussion of the essential elements of the state,
together with references to more exhaustive treatments of the subject,
in Garner, Introduction to Political Science (New York, igio) chap. 3.
See also Hall, op. cit., Pt. I, chap. i.
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for political, economic, or military organization, are factors
causing the most extreme diversity among international persons.
The second element essential to the existence of an interna-
tional person is its territory; and here again we find striking
differences in international society for which there are no
analogues in the relations of human beings. Natural persons
have a power of locomotion and enjoy great freedom of move-
ment, while the element of territory makes the international
person immovable. Differences in the area of territory are as
significant as differences in population. There are 8 square miles
in Monaco, 0,ooo square miles in Hayti, more than 3,000,000
square miles in Brazil, and more than 13,000,000 square miles in
the British Empire. Differences in the quality of territory are
equally striking. Ecuador's ii6,ooo square miles of territory
and Norway's i24,ooo square miles furnish physical bases for
quite different types of civilization. Differences in geographic
situation with respect to climatic conditions, access to the sea,
natural boundaries, and geographic unity are all factors that pro-
duce diversities peculiar to international persons. The publicist
who minimizes these differences in the attempt to reduce inter-
national persons to a common character outrages the realities of
international relations quite as much as the American diplomat
who is reported to have invited the Government of Switzerland
to participate in the naval demonstration at the opening of the
Panama Canal.
It is also essential to the existence of an international person
that there be a political organization or government. The form
and the powers of this political organization are determined by
the international person's constitution. Now there are diversities
among constitutions for which we find no parallels in the
aggregate of elements essential to the existence of physical life.
So far, at least, as these diversities affect an international per-
son's capacity to participate in international relations they must
be recognized by the law of nations. For illustration, no amount
of emphasis upon their artificial personality can disguise the
fact that international persons differ materially in respect to the
scope and- exercise of the treaty-making power. Some appear
to be without capacity to make certain kinds of treaties at all.
With respect to the exercise of the treaty power, the Constitu-
tion of the United States requires the approval of one chamber
of the legislature for all kinds of treaties, while other constitu-
tions require the approval of both chambers of the legislature
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for all treaties or for certain kinds of treaties only, or leave
treaty-making entirely to the executive."5  There are somewhat
similar differences among international persons with respect to
their capacity to exercise the war power.66 Capacity to partici-
pate in international relations is qualified also by the kind of
internal organization, whether unified, federal, confederate, or
real union. Austria-Hungary, composed of the Empire of Aus-
tria and the Kingdom of Hungary, each having final authority
over its subjects, but neither having separate relations with states
outside the composite whole which they form, is not the same
kind of international person as unified France, and as a practical
matter cannot enjoy precisely the same rights and duties. The
British Empire, composed of the United Kingdom, the self-
governing colonies, crown colonies, protectorates, and spheres of
influence is not the same kind of international person as Bulgaria,
and no amount of straining at fictions can give the two precisely
the same kinds of rights and duties. There is no profit in
insisting that the international person is an abstraction and that
all abstractions are alike, irrespective of the kind of government
represented. Relations are not conducted between abstractions.
The ideal or fictitious entity manifests itself only through organs,
and these organs may be so limited that there are certain acts
they cannot perform, or so that they are constrained to perform
the same act in a great variety of ways.8 7  There is no real
counterpart for all this among human beings.
The character of an international person depends very inti-
mately upon the character of its system of law, and here again we
find a variety of conditions prevailing. There is Chinese Law,
Hindu Law, Mohammedan Law, Civil Law, and the Common
Law; and the differences between certain of these systems have
contributed to produce some of the intricate problems of
international law.
Finally, in order that we may have a state in the international
sense, there must be some measure of independence, the pre-
Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (2d ed., Wash-
ington, i916); Michon, Les traitis internationaux devant les chambres
(Paris, igor).
'Constitutional provisions with reference to the war power may be
found in Dodd, Modern Constitutions (Chicago, igog) containing the
fundamental laws of twenty-two of the most important countries of the
world.
See Gray's discussion of sovereignty in op. cit., secs. i69-783.
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requisite to recognition as an international person. We are corn-
ing to see that there are degrees of independence, and that no
international person can be said to be absolutely independent
unless we are prepared to accept either a world state or universal
anarchy. The writers have recognized that differences in the
measure of independence enjoyed furnish a legal basis for the
recognition of different degrees of status.6  As Westlake
remarks, "it is not necessary for a state to be independent in
order to be a state of international law." 69  There are interna-
tional persons enjoying a normal degree of independence, and
below them others in various degrees of dependence, including
protectorates, vassal states, neutralized states, members of con-
federations, communities whose insurgency has been recognized,
and communitids whose belligerency has been recognized.70
Limitations upon independence may arise from special treaties
with certain powers, as in the relationships established between
the United States and Cuba,71 the Dominican Republic,72 Hayti,-3
Nicaragua, 74 and Panama 0 respectively. Or they may be created
by the provisions of general treaties like the Vienna Congress
Treaty of 1815,7' the Treaty of Paris of 1856,77 or the Treaty
of Berlin of 1878." They may be the result of an international
agreement such as that embodied in the treaties of 1839 guaran-
teeing Belgian neutrality,79 the treaty of 1867 neutralizing
Luxemburg, 0 or the conventions of 19o7 establishing the Central
' See G. F. de Martens, Pricis de droit des gens noderne de L'Europe
(ed. by Verg6, Paris, 1858) Introd., secs. 6-9; Bk. I, chap. 2; Bk. IV, chap.
x, sec. iig; and passim; and Moser, Versuch des neuesten Europiiischen
V6lkerrechts in Friedens-und Kriegszeiten (Frankfort-on-the-Main,
1777-8o), Pt. I, Bk. I, chaps. i and 2.
Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 21.
7 0Ibid., Vol. I, chap. 3.
Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc. (Washington, igio) Vol. I, pp.
362-364.
Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 418-420.
' (1916) io Am. JouR. INT. LAW, Surp. 234-238.
",Ibid., pp. 258-260.
Malloy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1349-1357.
Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1875-91) Vol. I, pp.
2o8-277.
'Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 1250-1265.
"Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 2759-2799.
9 Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 979-998.
'°Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 1801-i8o5.
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American Court of Justice.s - The legal significance of such
restrictions upon independence has been admitted by most of
the writers. It may prove necessary to give legal recognition
to varying degrees of independence resulting from the political
activities of the Great Powers, such as the hegemony of the
Great Powers in Europe, of the United States in the western
hemisphere, or of a League of Nations after the present war.
Writers generally have denounced differences of this kind as
purely political and without any foundation in international law ;82
but it is not at all certain that international law can continue to
blink at realities in this respect.88 It is conceivable that we may
find it desirable to accord legal recognition to other de facto
differences affecting the independence of international persons.
There is strong prejudice against admitting anything that involves
the recognition of new degrees of status in the law of nations.
It is sometimes pointed out that the whole progress of municipal
law has been from status to contract. This is true. We must
remember however that international law is still in a very rudi-
mentary stage of development, and that its subjects are persons
of an entirely different nature, admitting of entirely different
diversities. Degrees of independence must inevitably give rise
to differences of status for which there are no satisfactory
analogues in municipal law.
No profitable comparison can be drawn between the factors
contributing to differences of status in municipal law and in the
law of nations.8 4 Status in municipal law is either normal or
abnormal. Normal status is the legal character of the great
body of citizens for whom the general laws are made and to
whom in their full scope and meaning they are applied. Abnor-
(igo8) 2 AM. JouR. INT. LAW, SuPP. 219-243.
'E. g., see Nys, Etudes de droit international et de droit politique
(Paris, igoi) Vol. II, pp. 44-46; Oppenheim, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 17o-171;
and Rivier, Principes du droit des gens (Paris, i896) Vol. I, p. 125.
' See Funck-Brentano et Sorel, Pricis du droit des gens (3d ed., Paris,
igoo) p. 46; Lawrence, op. cit., Essay V; Lawrence, Principles of Inter-
national Law (5th ed., New York, 1913) chap. 4; Lorimer, Institutes
of the Law of Nations (London, 1883-84) Vol. I, Bk. II, chaps. 15 and
16; Westlake, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 322-323.
"The subject of status in municipal law is discussed in Austin, Lectures
on Jurisprudence (4th ed., London, 1873) Vol. II, pp. 7o5 ff.; Holland,
Jurisprudence, pp. 34o-346 and passim; Markby, Elements of Law (3d
ed., Oxford, 1885) secs. i68-i8o and 3oo.
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mal status is the legal character of those peculiar classes who for
one reason or another are regarded as improper subjects for
the application of the general laws and therefore are exempted
to a greater or less extent from their operation. The chief
varieties of abnormal status among natural persons may be
referred, according to Holland, to (i) sex, (2) minority, (3)
patria potestas and manus, (4) coverture, (5) celibacy, (6)
mental defect, (7) bodily defect, (8) rank, caste, and official
position, (9) race and color, (IO) slavery, (ii) profession, (12)
civil death, (13) illegitimacy, (14) heresy, (15) foreign national-
ity, and (16) hostile nationality. 5 Among international persons
status rests upon factors of an entirely different kind. Some of
the factors have received reluctant recognition from the pub-
licists, and some have been neglected. The whole subject has
been treated in a very unsatisfactory manner and in a few
instances virtually denied altogether8s This is chiefly because
the writers have failed to look beyond the artificial personality
of the state to its essential elements and the realities of its rela-
tions with other states. Until international law is accommodated
to the peculiar character of its subjects it can never be placed
upon a thoroughly scientific basis. This will hardly be hastened
by continuing to stress the analogy between international persons
and human beings.
Defects in the analogy are in no wise exhausted by a compari-
son of the elements essential to the existence of an international
person with the elements of natural existence. If we compare
natural and international persons with respect to their creation,
continuous existence, and extinction, the utter lack of any real
resemblance is equally striking. Human beings are physical
entities created by the natural processes of reproduction. Inter-
national persons are corporate entities created by the voluntary
subdivision of an existing international person, by the voluntary
combination of existing international persons, by a general agree-
ment enforced by the Great Powers, by separation as the result
of a successful insuri ection, by the recognition of a country pre-
viously denied admission into the international society, or by the
erection of a new international person in a region previously
uncivilized. The continuous existence of a natural person
85 Op. cit., p. 34o.
"Lorimer is one of the few writers who seems to have appreciated theimportance of the subject. See op. cit., Vol. I, Bk. II, chap. 15.
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depends upon the continuation of physical life. Human beings
are mortal. The continuous existence of an international person
depends upon the continuation in the necessary cobrdination of
the several elements essential to its existence, the elements being
those already enumerated and discussed. The international
person is immortal. Important changes may occur in an inter-
national person's population, territory, government, or even in
the degree of its independence, and yet it may continue to be a
person in international law. An international person cannot be
permanently deprived of any of these elements and continue in
existence, while a natural person may be deprived of both liberty
and possessions and continue to live. On the other hand, an
international person may survive an abnormal condition, like the
military occupation of Belgium, Servia, or Luxemburg, and not
only continue to live, but continue capable of assuming obliga-
tions and asserting rights. Finally, while natural persons cease
to exist only on physical death, the extinction of international
persons may be the result either of voluntary arrangement or of
conquest. It may be the consequence of the reverse of any
of the processes of creation named above. The consequences of
extinction are fundamentally different in the case of human
beings and of states. It is the merest spphistry to say that "as
individual human beings are born, attain the age of majority,
and die, so States come into existence, obtain full international
recognition, and cease to be."
Human beings differ fundamentally from states in respect to
their faculty of choosing or their will. Westlake says that we
are accustomed to think of the international person as "having
a responsibility and a conscience which are the summation of the
responsibilities and consciences of its members. 87 This is of
course a dogmatic fiction.
"In every aggregation of men there are some of the
number who impress their wills upon the others, who are
habitually obeyed by the others, and who are, in truth,
the rulers of the society. The sources from which their
authority flows are of the most diverse character. They
may be, or may pretend to be, divinely inspired. It may
be their physical strength, their wisdom, their cunning,
their virtues, their vices,-oftenest, perhaps, their assiduity
and persistence,-that have given them their power. The
sources of this power are, indeed, so various, and its
SOp. cit., Vol. I, p. 3.
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mode of action so subtle and often unknown even by those
who exercise it, that it is impossible to define or closely
trace it.'"s8
The fiction should never be abused by attempting to apply to
international persons standards of conduct or the like suited
only for the subjects of municipal law. This tendency to
regard international persons as if they were individuals with
a conscience, a sense of honor, a single interest, and a single life,
confuses our thinking. When we attempt to attribute to them
rights and duties copied from the rights and duties of human
beings living under municipal law we are simply injecting our-
selves into a world of fictions wherein the necessities of inter-
national relationships are bound to be obscured.
There are grave possibilities in the abuse of the analogy in
the future. Radical suggestions are being offered for the
amendment of international law, many of them of a constructive
character. It has been ably argued for example that if the
law of nations is to have a real binding force there must be a
change in its theory, and violations of such a character as to
threaten the peace and order of the international community
must be deemed to be in violation of the right of every member
of that community to have the law maintained and a legal injury
to every member.8 9 Progress along these lines may be misdi-
rected and defeated if we attempt merely to engraft principles
of criminal law and procedure upon the law of nations. There
is a widespread opinion that the constant menace of war can
be mitigated only by the further perfection of international
organization. One of the greatest obstacles to progress in this
direction will be found in the tendency to personify international
persons and attribute to them rights derived from the analogy
with human beings. The so-called rights of existence, independ-
ence, equality, and property, as hitherto construed by a majority
of the writers, are likely to prove an insuperable obstacle to real
progress in the direction of international government.
It has been no part of my purpose to belittle the usefulness of
municipal law in the development of the international system.
' Gray, op. cit., sec. 153. Interesting light is thrown upon this question
by such a book as Michels, Political Parties, a sociological study of the
oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy (New York, 1915).
"Root, The Outlook for International Law (1916) io Am. JouR. INT.
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Some of the earlier stages in the growth of that system were
assisted incalculably by borrowed principles. There are no
doubt principles of jurisprudence that are fundamental to all
legal systems, whatever the nature of their subjects. It has been
my purpose to urge that the analogy between natural and inter-
national persons must be used, if at all, with much greater dis-
crimination in the future. It must not be permitted to warp
our conception of international society, obstruct an understand-
ing of the true nature of international persons, perpetuate the
unreality of international law, encumber the system with rules
inapplicable to international persons, or establish impractical
classifications. If the law of nations is ever to become more than
"the vanishing point of jurisprudence" it must be accommodated
to the peculiar nature of its subjects.
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